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NOTES

semantic and statistical confusion," 20' and contended that Consumers' Counsel
I isres judicata (issue preclusion) as to the investor risk issue. Judge Locher
concluded that Consumers' Counsel I "stands for the proposition that
ratepayers are not to pay for these cancelled nuclear plants. This rule should
apply whether the mechanism used to subvert the 'used and useful' principle
2
is called 'amortization' or anything else" ! 05
Consumers' Counsel I extraordinarily highlights the urgent need for reform
of Oklahoma utility regulation. If the Oklahoma Supreme Court decides that
the risk of loss should be borne by the stockholders, that decision may not
end the controversy. Under existing Oklahoma law, P.S.O. could attempt to
circumvent that decision, as did the Ohio utility, through indirect means of
recoupment, such as an increased rate of return. A comprehensive statute
such as Oregon section 757.355 206 would effectively prevent indirect recovery
of abandonment losses.

Real Property: The Stability of Riparian Land Titles

and the Wild and Unruly Cimarron River
In 1976 the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued the opinion of Hodgden v.
Kliewer,' concerning riparian land located on the north and south sides ol
the nonnavigable Cimarron River. As evidenced by the original United States
Government Survey of 1873, movements of the river led to disputed ownership of land lying north of the Cimarron River as its channel existed at the
time of trial. Owners of land to the north of the disputed tract brought suit
against owners of land to the south to determine title to the land referred
' 2
to throughout the trial as the "hump.
With the Hodgden opinion as the point of reference, this note will discuss
the effect of that supreme court decision on the stability of riparian land titles
in the state of Oklahoma. Instability in riparian land titles fosters recurring
disputes and litigation over riparian tracts of land. The settlement of these
disputes can result in large losses of land and income for a riparian owner,
as was the case in Hodgden v. Kliewer.3 In Hodgden the dispute in ownership
arose after the mineral rights to the land in question had been leased for oil
and gas exploration. In quieting title for the owners of the land to the south
and across the river from the disputed tract, the court chose not to apply
204. Id. at 117.
205. Id.
206. OR. REv. STAT. § 757.355 (1979). See supra text accompanying note 169.

1. 557 P.2d 885 (Okla. 1976).
2. Id. at 885.
3..!d.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36

the reappearing riparian lands doctrine,' which had been previously applied
in several Oklahoma riparian cases. In rejecting the doctrine under the facts
in Hodgden, the court clearly restricted its application to a specific set of
circumstances. The possible repercussions from the court's decision to limit
the doctrine's application led the dissent in Hodgden to believe that the majority opinion would lead to an instability in the riparian land titles, and,
thus, an increase in quiet title actions in Oklahoma. The validity of the dis-

sent's belief will be closely examined.
The Dissent
In dissenting, Justice John B. Doolin concluded that the "reappearing
riparian lands doctrine" followed in previous Oklahoma cases was more
equitable than the position adopted by the court.' Justice Doolin stated: "[T]he
majority opinion... overlooks rights previously protected by this court, rights
to 'reappearing riparian lands.' "6 The majority decision, he thought, added
confusion to the difficult problem of determining ownership of riparian lands
after river boundaries have been changed by the forces of nature. As Justice

Doolin noted, "Cimarron" was of Spanish derivation and meant runaway,
wild, or unruly.7 His insight provided an appropriate description of the Cimarron's meandering and changing banks, which has caused litigation involving
the land in question on two occasions.
HistoricalBackground

In 1934 the movements of the Cimarron River resulted in litigation by the
predecessors in title to the parties in the Hodgden case. In Mitchell v. Meyer,8
the District Court of Major County, in a decision that was not appealed,
held that the river had moved northward by the gradual process of accretion
4. The reappearing riparian lands doctrine has been applied in conjunction with the common
law doctrines of accretion and avulsion in an effort to provide stability to riparian land titles.
The doctrine simply stated provides that where riparian land is lost by submergence or erosion
from a river's movement, but later through subsequent change in the course of the river the
water disappears and the land reappears, and the boundaries are susceptible of being definitely
identified, title to the restored land is vested in the owner of the fee at the time the submerging
or erosion occurred. Accretion was defined in Willett v. Miller, 176 Okla. 278, 55 P.2d 90, 92
(1936) as: "Addition of portions of soil by gradual (imperceptible) deposition through the operation of natural causes, to that already in possession of owner." Avulsion was defined in State
ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Warden, 200 Okla. 613, 198 P.2d 402 (1948) as: [A] sudden
removal of land from the estate of one man to "that of another by an inundation or a current
or by a sudden change in the course of a river, by which a part of one man's estate is cut
off and joined to the estate of another, and property thus separated continues in the original
owner. "
5. Hodgden v. Kliewer, 557 P.2d 885, 890 (Okla. 1976).
6. Id.
7. G. SHIRK, OKLaHOMA PLACE NAmEs 52 (1974). The origin of the name as applied to
the river is generally considered to be of Spanish derivation, from Rio de los Carneros Cimarr6n,
or "River of the Wild Sheep."
8. No. 4489 (Dist. Ct. Major County, Okla., Sept. 14, 1934).
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as evidenced by the original United States Government Survey of 1873." In
1934 the river's movement north was within its own banks, which had been
surveyed in 1873 as approximately one-half to three-quarters of a mile in
width.' 0
Thereafter, the Cimarron River moved farther north into a new channel
(as shown by a 1950 survey of the river)." This northerly movement continued until May 1952, whereupon the river, as evidenced by a 1954 survey,
perceivably changed its location to the south as a result of a single flood.' 2
The disputed land in Hodgden was located in sections 1, 2, 11, and 12, all
in Township 22 North, Range 13 W.I.M., Major County. The location of
the Cimarron River in 1873, 1950, and 1954 is shown by the following plat' 3 :

RI3W.I.A

T22KN

CIMARRON

RIVER

LEGEND
1873 CHANNEL .
1950 CHANNEL
1954 CHANNEL .

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Cited in Hodgden v. Kliewer, 557 P.2d 885, 887 (Okla. 1976).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On the date of trial, Appellant Hodgden owned: lot 6 in Section 11, lots 5, 6, and
7 in Section 2, all in Township 22 North, Range 13 W.I.M., Woods County.
Appellee Kliewer owned: lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Section 11, lots I and 2 in Section
12, all in Township 22 North, Range 13 W.I.M., Major County.
Both appellant Hodgden and appellee Kliewer claimed to own land lying
north of the Cimarron River as it existed at the time of trial. At the proceedings, it was shown that between 1936 and 1950 the river moved farther
north in sections 1 and 2, destroying lots 6 and 7 and a portion of the N/2
of SE/4 of section 2 and lots 5 and 6 and N/2 of SW/4 of section 1." In
1952, the river in one flood returned to its original channel, restoring the
land and lots in sections 1 and 2."
The trial court, quieting title in the owners of the land to the south of
the disputed tracts (Kliewer), held that:
(1) the river moved north by gradual and imperceptible process
of accretion, adding such accreted land to the riparian lots on the
south bank of the river; (2) the river, when at its northernmost
point of the "hump", moved south by the process of avulsion
during the flood of May, 1952, thereby cutting a new channel on
the south side of the "hump" and immediately north of Lots 1
and 2 in Section 12, and Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Section 11, all
in Township 22 North, Range 13 West; and, (3) the avulsive process did not affect the ownership of any of the "hump"."
From this verdict, Hodgden appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Analysis of the Arguments in Hodgden
Kliewer submitted that the Cimarron River's movement northward by accretion had been judicially determined in the case of Mitchell v. Meyer, 7 involving Kliewer's predecessor in title. He argued that such determination was
not only conclusive but also established a presumption that accretion continued unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.'" The judgment in

14. Id. at 888.

15. Id.
16. Id. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 335 (1981) defines accretion as:
Riparian accretions: Where from natural causes land forms by imperceptible degrees
upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by accumulation of material or by the recession of the stream, such land bqlongs to the owner
of the bank, subject to any existing right of way over the bank.
60 OIFA. STAT. § 336 (1981) defines avulsion as:
Removals in mass may be reclaimed: If a river or stream carries away, by sudden
violence, a considerable and distinguishable part of the same bank, the owner of
the part carried away may reclaim it within a year after the owner of the land
to which it has been united takes possession thereof.
17. No. 4489. (Dist. Ct. Major County, Okla. 1934).
18. Hodgden v. Kliewer, 557 P.2d 885, 888 (Okla. 1976).
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the Mitchell case vested title to 308.03 acres (part of the land disputed in
Hodgden) by accretion in Kliewer's predecessor in title.' 9
Hodgden contended that in both instances the river had moved by the process of avulsion, resulting in no change upon the boundary limits when the
river moved to the north and then back to within its original channel (as
evidenced by the 1873 government survey). Hodgden also argued that even
if the river's movement north was by accretion and back south by avulsion
an original owner who loses riparian land through the river's movement would
be restored such land if the river later receded to its original channel (the
reappearing riparian lands doctrine).2" In support thereof, Hodgden cited cases
from the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court.2 '
In rejecting Hodgden's contentions, the majority opinion stated that the
second argument urged by Hodgden had been mistakenly endorsed by the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Mikel v. Kerr,22 and in Herron v. Choctaw
& Chickasaw Nations23 (each involving disputed tracts of riparian land in
Oklahoma).2 4 The Hodgden court held that, "there is no question about [the
reappearing riparian lands doctrine] being the Oklahoma law where the river
has moved in both directions by accretion." 25 Thus, the court rejected the
proposition that the law also applied to circumstances where the river had
moved first by accretion and then back by avulsion. The supreme court concluded that the-misunderstanding expressed by the Tenth Circuit stemmed from
a misinterpretation of Oklahoma case law.2" In sustaining the district court,
the supreme court held that
where the river had moved north by gradual and imperceptible processes of accretion, adding accreted land to the riparian lots on
the south bank of the river, and where the river thereafter moved
south by the process of avulsion during a flood, the avulsive processes did not affect ownership of any of the previously accreted
27
land.
This was the court's determination, even though the land that had originally
accreted to the riparian lots on the south bank was on the north side of the
river following the flood of 1952 (avulsion).

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Mikel v. Kerr, 499 F.2d 1178 (10th
Cir. 1974); Herron v. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations, 228 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1956); Ford v.
Harris, 383 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1963); Mapes v. Neustadt, 197 Okla. 585, 173 P.2d 442 (1946);
Hunzicker v. Kleeden, 161 Okla. 102, 17 P.2d 384 (1932).
22. 449 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974).
23. 228 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1956).
24. Hodgden v. Kliewer, 557 P.2d 885, 889 (Okla. 1976).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 885-86.
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Hodgden relied upon three Oklahoma Supreme Court cases (Hunzicker v.
Kleeden, 28 Mapes v. Neustadt,29 Ford v. Harris")to support his proposition
that "when land adjoining a river is lost through the movement of a river
and the river later recedes to its original channel, the original owner is
restored." 3' In the Hunzicker case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed
the principle of reappearing riparian lands for the first time. Adoption of
the principle by the court was based partially on the South Dakota case of
Allard v. Curran.32 In Allard a nonriparian tract of land became riparian
through the river's imperceptible cutting away of the original riparian owner's
land (accretion). Subsequently, by accretion, the river receded, restoring the
original riparian land, whereupon the nonriparian owner claimed that upon
his tract becoming riparian he was entitled to alluvion deposits on such land.3
In rejecting the nonriparian owner's claim, the court stated: "We believe that
after appellant's land had been restored by the action of the river, being capable
of identification, it belonged to appellant and should be treated as though
it had never been submerged at all." ' 3 In rejecting the same argument by
the nonriparian owner in Hunzicker and in adopting the reappearing riparian
lands doctrine, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
[W]here a nonnavigable stream... erodes away a portion of the
land of defendants, defendants' title to said land continues to exist
as a part of the river bed and, of course, under this . . . when

the river recedes and abandons the river bed, said land continues
to be the property of the former owners.3
It is crucial to note that the court in Hunzicker made no actual reference
to the manner in which the river receded (avulsion as opposed to accretion).
This is especially important when compared with the holding in Hodgden v.
Kliewer,36 in which the court stated that the Tenth Circuit had misinterpreted
the Oklahoma law on reappearing riparian lands in that the law only applied
where a river has receded by the process of accretion.
Upon close reading of the Hunzicker case, it would appear that the river
may have receded by the process of avulsion. From the facts of the case it
is not certain whether the river's "abandonment" was by accretion or avulsion. However, the court's use of the term "abandonment" would seem to
37
imply that the river moved by the process of avulsion.

28. 161 Okla. 102, 17 P.2d 384 (1932).
29. 197 Okla. 585, 173 P.2d 442 (1946).
30. 383 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1963).
31. Hodgden v. Kliewer, 557 P.2d 885, 888 (Okla. 1976).
32. 41 S.D. 73, 168 N.W. 761 (1918).
33. Hunzicker v. Kleeden, 161 Okla. 102, 103, 17 P.2d 384, 385 (1932).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 385.
36. 557 P.2d 885 (Okla. 1976).
37. See Musser, Easy Come, Easy Go, or Avulsion Plus Accretion Does Not EqualRevulsion,
48 OKLA. B.J. q-177 (1978).
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It is also interesting that in the answer brief submitted to the Hunzicker
court, the appellee, Kleeden, in describing the river's movement, stated "that
when the river changed its course this strip of ground immediately reappeared
.. .and the original boundary lines . . . could be located and run out by

the surveyor. . .. ,,3This factual description of the river's movement was
taken from the second proposition of the answer brief, which concluded:
[T]he doctrine of submerged lands governs this suit and.

. .

that

where land is submerged by the action of water or even where it
is eroded away, when it reappears upon the same site, either by
owner can locate
accretion, reliction or avulsion, and the original
39
his land, he does not lose the title thereto.
While it might be contended that the Hunzicker case involved landowners
on the same side of the river as compared with the Hodgden case where the
parties owned patented lots on opposite sides of the river, the Hunzicker case
states clearly the rights to be protected of any riparian owner under the reappearing riparian lands doctrine. Thus, where riparian property is gradually
washed away and the river later abandons its channel, the owner of riparian
land acquires, on its reappearance, such property as he had prior to the stream
washing away said land. The Hunzicker court held this to be the more equitable
view when the boundaries were capable of determination, and vested title in
the party whose land had been washed away, since the land had been platted
into lots and blocks that made it readily identifiable upon its reappearance. 4
In Mapes v. Neustadt,4' the Oklahoma Supreme Court was presented with
a river that first moved by avulsion to the nonriparian tract and then receded
by accretion, restoring the riparian tract. Upon restoration the riparian tract
was capable of identification, which led the supreme court to hold:
We think that the reliance of Neustadt in the equitable principles
applied in the Hunzicker case and his reliance upon the ability to
identify his land by government plat and survey following the
restoration of his land justified the trial court in rendering a judgment in his favor .... IT]he ability to identify according to government plat and survey was the basis for the Hunzicker case.42
In holding that Hunzicker controlled in the Mapes case, it is important to
realize that even where the river's first movement was by avulsion, the court's
chief requirement for applying the reappearing riparian lands doctrine was

38. Answer Brief for the Defendants in Error at 57, Hunzicker v. Kleeden, 161 Okla. 102,
17 P.2d 384 (1932).
39. Id. at 58.
40. 161 Okla. at 103, 104, 17 P.2d at 384, 385.
41. Mapes v. Neustadt, 197 Okla. 585, 173 P.2d 442 (1946). Here the supreme court applied
the "reappearing riparian lands doctrine" to a new factual circumstance-first the river moved
by avulsion and then back by accretion.
42. Id. at 587, 173 P.2d at 444.
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still the ability to identify land according to government plat and survey upon
its restoration.
The case of Ford v. Harris"3 presented the Oklahoma Supreme Court with
a river that had first moved gradually by accretion to the nonriparian tract
and then later also receded by the process of accretion. The nonriparian owner
argued that once the river had completely passed over the land in question,
reaching his own land, he became a riparian owner and was entitled to follow
the river when it receded. The court, as it had done in Hunzicker, rejected
the argument that the old boundary lines had been destroyed upon the stream
completely submerging the riparian land in question. It held that when the
river receded, the original riparian owner was entitled to his property, which
was identifiable through a government survey."4
It is important to note in Fordthat the supreme court applied the reappearing
riparian lands doctrine, rather than the law of accretion, to facts where a
river had clearly moved in both directions by accretion." ' Thus, the supreme
court again based its decision on the ability to identify the riparian tract's
boundaries by government survey upon restoration.
In a brief filed before the Oklahoma Supreme Court in support of a petition for rehearing, Hodgden stated that the facts in the Ford case had
similarities to his own case." Hodgden argued that the N/2 SW/4 of section
2 and the N/2 W/4 of section 1 were nonriparian as Ford's land was, and
lots 6 and 7 of section 2 owned by Hodgden were riparian, as the Harris's
land was. Therefore, Hodgden concluded that when the river first moved
gradually north, passing over all of lots 6 and 7 into property that had been
formerly nonriparian, the court, as in Ford, should have determined that
Hodgden owned lots 6 and 7, which were easily identifiable by government
survey after the river had abandoned its channel to the south. 7
The distinguishing factor between the Ford and Hodgden cases was that
while both streams eroded away the riparian tract by accretion, in Hodgden
the movement of the river back in the direction from which it came was by
avulsion and not accretion, as in the Ford case. However, after examining
Hunzicker and its progeny, it does not seem that this factor had been clearly
distinguished prior to the Hodgden decision. Three federal cases, interpreting
Oklahoma case law involving riparian land in Oklahoma, are informative for

43. 383 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1963).
44. Id. at 23.
45. Because of the questionable facts surrounding the Hunzicker case, one might argue that
until a case like Ford, the Oklahoma law was unclear as to whether the "reappearing riparian
land doctrine" would apply to facts where the river had moved in both directions by accretion.
Therefore, in applying the doctrine, the supreme court refused to allow the nonriparian owner
to follow the river when it receded, even under facts where the river moved in both directions
by accretion.
46. Appellants Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 11, Hodgden v. Kliewer, 557
P.2d 885 (Okla. 1976) (Doolin, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (see plat at note 13 supra).
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analyzing the reappearing riparian lands doctrine prior to the Hodgden
48
decision.
In Mikel v. Kerr,"9 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed
arguments on the right of ownership to property that had been first submerged
by the gradual movement of a river, and then subsequently restored by the
gradual recession of that river. The court held that the property remained
in the owner of the record title upon the land reappearing, but before holding
this the court closely examined the Hunzicker case and those following it.50
A significant point in the Mikel case is that Mikel contended that Hunzicker
and its progeny applied only in situations where a river had moved by avulsion,
a contention that is diametrically opposed to what the Hodgden case stands
for." While the Tenth Circuit rejected this contention, it did point out that
it interpreted Hunzicker as applying to cases where a river subsequently receded
by avulsion, but was in no way limited only to avulsion." The court, in reviewing Hunzicker, concluded:
While the syllabus of the court speaks of the subsequent movement of the river therein involved as an "abandonment of the
channel", the text of the court's decision makes it clear that the
rule therein announced applies whenever a river subsequently
"recedes", uncovering land which was formerly riparian. Indeed,
an examination of the authority relied upon and cited by the
Hunzicker court establishes that Oklahoma embraced the rule that
whenever riparian land reappears through a subsequent change in
the course of a river, either by avulsion or by a river's gradual
movement, ownership to the reappearing land, if it can be identified, is vested in the record title holder. See Allard v. Curran,
41 S.D. 73, 168 N.W. 761 (1918) and Keel v. Sutton, 142 Tenn.
341, 219 S.W. 351 (1920) (and cases cited therein), cited by the
Hunzicker court, wherein the adopted rule is applied in instances
of gradual reversal of a river's course; and see Stockley v. Cissna,
119 F. 812 (6th Cir. 1902), cited by the Hunzicker court, wherein
the adopted rule is applied in instances of avulsion.3
The court of appeals further expressed that its own earlier decision had
recognized that Hunzicker and its equitable principles applied to circumstances
where the land reappeared by either accretion or avulsion. In Herron v.
Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations, " it was stated:
48. Mikel v. Kerr, 499 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974); Herron v. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations,
228 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1956); Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Tibbetts, 430 F. Supp. 714
(E.D. Okla. 1976).
49. 499 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1180.
52. Id. at 1181.
53. Id.(emphasis added).
54. 228 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1956).
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Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, it is the law in Oklahoma
that where because of inroads of a river riparian land is lost by
erosion or becoming submerged but through subsequent change
in the course of the river the water disappears and the land reappears, and the boundaries are susceptible of being definitely identified, title to the restored land is vested in the owner of the fee
at the time the erosion or submerging occurred."
While it might be argued that Mikel could be distinguished by the fact that
the river in that case was navigable, whereas in Hodgden the river was nonnavigable, the Tenth Circuit concluded:
It is apparent that the Hunzicker court did not consider a river's
non-navigability to be a prerequisite to application of the stated
rule. In fact, while the court adopted and applied the stated rule
to the facts before it, where the river was non-navigable, it pointed
out that the caselaw in other states6 for and against the adopted
rule dealt with navigable streams.
The Hunzicker court, in forming its opinion with case law based on navigable
streams, observed that the river's nonnavigability helped establish an additional theory for reaching its result. The court reasoned that since a riparian
owner has vested property rights in a nonnavigable riverbed to the center of
the stream, it followed that where the riparian owner's land becomes submerged, his title to said land continues to exist as long as any portion of the land
continues to exist as part of the riverbed."
In the 1976 case of Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Tibbetts," handed
down six months before the Hodgden decision and not considered in that
decision, the United States District Court, Eastern District, Oklahoma, interpreted the reappearing riparian lands doctrine in Oklahoma as applying to
situations where the land reemerged by the process of avulsion. In Tibbetts
the river first moved by the process of accretion, submerging the land in question. Thereafter, by the process of avulsion, the river receded and restored
the land that had been submerged by the river's first movement. Under facts
identical to those in Hodgden, the court vested title in the original record
title holder because the boundaries following reemergence were capable of
being identified."
Hodgden also presented the United States Supreme Court case of Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona." The Bonelli case was examined in Tibbetts" and compared with the reappearing riparian lands doctrine in Oklahoma as interpreted
55. Id. at 832.
56. Mikel v. Kerr, 499 F.2d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 1974).
57. 161 Okla. 102, 103, 17 P.2d 384, 385 (1932).
58. 430 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
59. Id.
60. 414 U.S. 313 (1973). The Bonelli case was only cited in the Hodgden case without any
specific reference being made to it by the court.
61. 430 F. Supp. 714, 716 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
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by the court. In its comparison the United States District Court concluded:
The Federal rule appears to be identical. In Bonelli Cattle Company v. Arizona, supra, in which Federal law was applied, a
navigable river moved by accretion in one direction with the law
of accretion above set out applying and the river later moved back
by avulsion (a man-made rechannelization but nonetheless an avulsion) with earlier submerged lands surfacing as dry land and the
Court held: ". .Now that the land has resurfaced in the process
of rechannelization, it should return to the state of the riparian
owner. "62

To make this point clear, the district court quoted the following from footnote 27 of the Boneii case:
Under the doctrine of re-emergence, when identifiable riparian land,
once lost by erosion, subsequently re-emerges as a result of perceptible change in the river course, title to the surfaced land revests
in its former owner. See Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. (158)
at 174-175, 38 S.Ct. 301, 62 L.Ed. 638; Beaver v. United States,
(9 Cir.), 350 F.2d (4) at 11. The re-emergence doctrine has been
accepted by a number of states, Herron v. Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations, .(applying Oklahoma law); State v. Gill [Alabama law];
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones [Louisiana law]; Mulry v. Norton
[New York law]. [Citations omitted.]63
It appears from footnote 27 of the Bonelli case that the United States
Supreme Court adopted the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Oklahoma case
law on the reappearing riparian lands doctrine. In Hodgden the majority concluded that the court of appeals had misinterpreted Oklahoma case law and
rejected that court's interpretation. While the dissent in Hodgden reiterated
the conclusions of the Tenth Circuit with an examination of the Oklahoma
case law, the majority held that the reappearing riparian lands doctrine did
not apply in situations where the river receded by the process of avulsion
and examined only the river's first movement to determine whether any change
in the property boundaries had occurred through the movement of the river
by accretion.
Analysis of the Dissent in Hodgden
In examining the Oklahoma law, Justice Doolin, in his dissent, con64
cluded that the majority opinion overlooked rights previously protected.
Justice Doolin asserted that the Oklahoma case law "has heretofore applied
the 'reappearing riparian lands doctrine' to riparian lands where the original

62. Id. at 716-17.
63. Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
64. Hodgden v. Kliewer, 557 P.2d 885, 890 (Okla. 1976).
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boundaries of a river can be identified from an existing governmental

survey. . .. -6" He further stated:
I conclude the majority simply adds confusion to this most difficult problem by not clearly accepting or overruling the . . .
doctrine as espoused in the Tenth Circuit in Mikel v. Kerr....
I believe that the "reappearing lands" doctrine is more equitable,
particularly for a river where an untrained observer can detect the
meanderings and changes of banks within the old channel with comparative ease. Location of the boundaries is likewise in my opinion,
a simple task of carrying "direction and distance" to an identifiable
point on the ground from a United States governmental survey."6
Justice Doolin believed that the doctrine of "reappearing lands" was conducive to the stability of riparian land titles and emphasized: "Its retention
or adoption would lessen or curtail quiet title actions such as this and the
one had in 1934, covering a part of these same lands." '67
Conclusion
Whether the Tenth Circuit misinterpreted Hunzicker and its progeny, as
the majority concluded in Hodgden, is a question that upon close examination of Hunzicker alone, remains open to doubt. This doubt seems warranted
based on three points:
(1) the holding of Stockley v. Cissna," which the Hunzicker case followed
in adopting the reappearing riparian lands doctrine;
(2) the language used in the Hunzicker case, which seems to imply the
river's second movement was by an avulsive process; and
(3) the Hunzicker court's holding for the defendant Kleeden, whose proposition stated that title is not lost by the original owners when the land reappears by accretion, reliction, or avulsion.
First, in Mikel6 the Tenth Circuit stated: "see Stockley v. Cissna,
cited by the Hunzicker court, wherein the adopted rule is applied in instances
of avulsion." 7 1 In Stockley7" the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
quoting a portion of Murly v. Norton," stated: "It is equally true, however,
that when the water disappears from the land, either by gradual retirement
therefrom, or the elevation of the land by avulsion or accretion, or even the
exclusion of the water by artificial means, its proprietorship returns to the
original riparian owners.""1
65. Id.
66. Id.at 890-91.
67. Id.at 891.
68. 119 F. 812 (6th Cir. 1902).
69. Mikel v. Kerr, 499 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974).
70. Id. at 1181.
71. Stockley v. Cissna, 119 F. 812 (6th Cir. 1902).
72. 100 N.Y. 426, 3 N.E. 581 (1885).

73. Stockley v. Cissna, 119 F. 812, 831 (6th Cir. 1902). Murly v. Norton applied to a beach
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Second, as pointed out in Mikel, the Hunzicker court spoke of the river's

a term
subsequent movement as involving an "abandonment" of the channel,
74
the Tenth Circuit looked upon as usually denoting avulsion.

Third, in Kleeden's answer brief (judgment for Kleeden and appeal
affirmed), the second proposition stated that "where land reappears upon

the same site, either by accretion, reliction or avulsion and the original owner
can locate his land, then such owner is entitled to reclaim said property."" 5
Furthermore, Kleeden's answer brief stated: "[T]he record clearly discloses
that when the river changed its course, this strip of ground immediately
reappeared." 7 6
The refusal of the Hodgden court to apply the reappearing riparian lands

doctrine where a river receded by avulsion forces an Oklahoma court to turn
to a river's first movement to determine the parties' boundaries as followed
by the law of accretion or avulsion. The 77law of accretion and avulsion has
been codified in the state of Oklahoma.
The doctrine of accretion, having its roots in the common law, has been
justified on the desirability of assuring the riparian owners' access to the water
when the riparian quality of a tract may be its most valuable feature (i.e.,
to the owner of the tree belongs the fruit). Such a justification seemed quite
relevant when this country was a new frontier and property values were greatly
increased by riparian property that provided the only means for drinking water
and irrigation.
Today, however, with other means of obtaining water, with the high level
of pollution in many rivers, and with the inability to use a nonnavigable river
for transportation,7" it seems doubtful that it can be said that the riparian
quality of a tract is its most valuable feature. This is especially true in
Oklahoma where the ownership of the mineral rights of the riparian property
would have to be one of the most valuable features of that tract when conbeing washed away and then reappearing. Stockley applied the case to a quiet title action involving disputes to land ownership through the movement of the Mississippi River.
74. See Musser, supra note 37.
75. Answer Brief for the Defendants in Error at 54, Hunzicker v. Kleeden, 161 Okla. 102,
17 P.2d 384 (1932).
76. Id. at 57.
77. 60 OKRA. STAT. §§ 335, 336 (1981):
Riparian accretions: Where from natural causes land forms by imperceptible degrees
upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by accumulation
of material or by the recession of the stream, such land belongs to the owner of
the bank, subject to any existing right of way over the bank.
60 OKLA. STAT. § 336 (1981):
Removals in mass may be reclaimed: If a river or stream carries away, by sudden
violence, a considerable and distinguishable part of a bank, and bears it to the
opposite bank, or to another part of the same bank, the owner of part carried
away may reclaim it within a year after the owner of the land to which it has
been united takes possession thereof.
78. All of the major Oklahoma rivers have been determined as nonnavigable except a portion of the Arkansas River. See Vickery v. Yahola Sand & Gravel Co., 158 Okla. 120, 12 P.2d
881 (1932).
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sidering that the smallest change in boundaries could mean the loss of
thousands of dollars in oil and gas royalties. Both the Hunzicker and Hodgden
cases resulted from disputes in ownership over a tract of land after it had
been leased for oil and gas exploration.
In Hodgden the court ignored a receding river that exposed land clearly
identifiable by government survey. The court, in determining the parties'
disputed boundaries, looked to the river's first movement and applied the
common law doctrine of accretion as adopted by the Oklahoma legislature.
However, to determine the riparian owners' boundaries by the laws of accretion and avulsion alone, under these circumstances, seems highly inequitableespecially in Oklahoma, where it is now arguable that the desirability of assuring access to a river's water may no longer be justified on the common law
belief that the riparian quality of a tract of land is its most valuable feature.
The application of these common law principles, in Hodgden, where the river
suddenly receded and exposed identifiable land, seems questionable when it
is considered that in the end not only did the riparian owner to the south
retain access to the river, he also gained more than 300 acres of property
on the north side of the Cimarron.19
With results such as this, is it not time to examine the soundness of following the common law doctrines of accretion and avulsion as the state's primary
means for providing stability to riparian land titles?80 Historically, the doctrines provided simple rules for determining ownership disputes when there
were no adequate methods to identify accurately the boundaries of riparian
tracts of land. Moreover, the law of accretion attempted to ensure access to
a river at a time in history when even the smallest amounts of water were
extremely valuable. Yet, even today, if the riparian owner is lucky and the
river moves in the "right" direction by an imperceptible process, he not only
retains access to the river but also acquires additional valuable property. Can
it be said that such a result is fair when property boundaries can be clearly
identified by a government survey? Furthermore, if the riparian owner is
unlucky and the river moves suddenly, overnight, away from his land, under
the law of avulsion, such an owner will not be able to follow the river, and
thus he will have-lost his so-called "most valuable feature" of the property.
When considering, first, how valuable the mineral rights can be to a riparian
tract of land in Oklahoma, and second, the advancements made since statehood
in obtaining water through irrigation, reservoir collection, and water wells,
it must be said that the primary importance once placed upon the riparian
quality of a tract of land has been greatly eroded. This statement is further
supported by Oklahoma's statutory water rights provisions, which allow the
nonriparian owner to appropriate stream water for beneficial use through the
Oklahoma Water Resources Board. 8'
79. Hodgden v. Kliewer, 557 P.2d 885, 887 (Okla. 1976).

80. Note, Oil and Gas: The Inapplicabilityof Accretion to Severed MineralEstates, 34 OKLA.
L. REV. 826 (1981).
81. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.2(A) (1981) states: "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and the limit of the right to the use of water ..
" 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.2(B) (1981) states:
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Although the equitable principles of the reappearing riparian lands doctrine,
as first espoused in Hunzicker v. Kleeden,8" attempted to provide stability
to riparian land titles in Oklahoma, the decision in Hodgden severely limited
the application of the doctrine. This limitation fails to curtail quiet title actions such as the one in Hodgden, which concerned land that has been involved in litigation twice since 1934.
The reappearing riparian lands doctrine in Hunzicker may not have been
the definitive answer for the stability of land titles and riparian rights, but
it was a step in the right direction-a step over which the Oklahoma Supreme
83
Court has appeared to stumble with its decision in Hodgden v. Kliewer.
Thus, as land becomes more valuable, the Oklahoma courts may be faced
with recurring litigation involving riparian tracts of land bordering rivers such
as the wild and unruly Cimarron.
Mark Stonecipher

"Priority in time shall give the better right." 82 O, A. STAT. § 105.3 (1981) states: "Any person,
corporation or association may exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire right-of-way
for the storage or conveyance of waters for beneficial use." Thus, the nonriparian owner has
statutory rights to appropriate stream water for his beneficial use through the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board.
82. 161 Okla. 102, 17 P.2d 384 (1932).
83. 557 P.2d 885 (Okla. 1976).
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